Analysis of Federalist No. 1

By guest author Praise of Folly

The Constitutional Convention of 1787 was the backdrop to the Federalist Papers. In the Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison presented the Federalist case in response to the Anti-Federalists, led by Patrick Henry, who feared the power of a strong federal government. The Federalists’ main contention was the need for a stronger central government than what then existed under the Articles of Confederation.

Both parties were seeking to avoid the arbitrary and authoritarian rule of the European Monarchies — the British Monarchy in particular, having just fought to become free from it — but the Federalists feared that a confederation of independent states would be too weak to preserve the unity of the nation against interference from foreign powers who would then subjugate the American (former) Colonies. The Anti-Federalists believed that the U.S. government itself might become that new tyranny. Both factions agreed that the goal was self-government, but they disagreed on how that might best be preserved.

Alexander Hamilton, a proponent of a public debt and a strong federal government, begins Federalist No. 1 by stating how the Articles of Confederation have failed. Hamilton, in his mind, so clearly saw the virtues of the new Constitution as self-evident. Two words appear in the opening paragraph that inform much of the meaning of the Federalist Papers: Union and Empire. By Union Hamilton is referring to a strong bond uniting the several states together. The choice of Empire is an interesting one. Empire was then, as it is now, associated with top-down hierarchical and arbitrary rule — think the Roman Caesars — and yet Hamilton here uses this term in reference to a union of several states whose main aim is to preserve self-government. One would assume that by Empire Hamilton does not mean “tyranny” — instead, possibly just the “extent of territorial dominion,” as an empire has a wide extent of rule over many nations and peoples. These two words indicate Hamilton’s focus on centralization and authority rather than radically diffuse and dispersed power.

The central issue to Hamilton is whether free men can come together and through the use of reason and foresight construct a constitution that preserves liberty… or are free states just the result of fortune and chance? Hamilton supposes that, obstacles aside, the former option is possible and desirable. In subsequent essays, the Federalists will seek to demonstrate this fact.

Hamilton sees a problem in how best to identify the Public Good of the Nation. Each man, through his passions, position in society, and self-interest — even a man of otherwise good character and a true patriot — might have his vision clouded and not see the true public good for what it is. He might even convince himself to see his private good as synonymous with the public good and become an obstacle to the formation of a good government because of his parochial motivations. He may, for example, see a diminution of his position as an evil — say, local authority devolving upward to the federal government — and attempt to thwart the constitutional process. In short, Hamilton argues that there are broadly two motives for opposition to this new constitution: (1) ignorance and (2) selfishness. Men of good character might be motivated by otherwise positive ends, but through ignorance lose sight of the common good; or they might be motivated by private and selfish ends. In either case, Hamilton argues that as in religion, the use of outright coercion to correct the recalcitrant is to be avoided, in that it produces less-than-desirable results.

Hamilton characterizes his opponents as men who also seek to use the art of persuasion to make converts to their political cause, a concession that they are, if not reasonable men, at least men of good faith. He accuses them of erring in their excessive support of the rights of the people against federal power, a defect he states is a fault of the head rather than the heart. He views this jealousy for popular rights as an excess of love of liberty and reminds them that liberty cannot be guaranteed without a civil authority with the power to do so. He then appeals to the legacy of classical history in that it was those who made appeals to the people who soonest became the tyrants and despots of antiquity — one might recall Julius Caesar.

Hamilton then makes his appeal to the reader that he is actuated by noble causes and will freely declare his aims and reasoning. He hopes to show clearly and concisely that his motives and goals are open and transparent. The topics he will in due course consider are: the preservation of the union to maintain the present prosperity; that an energetic government is needed; that this proposed constitution is aimed at the true goals of republicanism; and that this constitution and government will maintain the security and future of our form of government.

Hamilton alleges that the main argument offered by the opponents of this new constitution is that these thirteen states are currently too great to be governed by a single power. He argues that the reasons for the union are self-evident and arguments need not be given but for objections of these opponents. He believes that without the union the dissolution of all order will result.

I agree wholeheartedly with Hamilton on his opening claim that through the use of reason and reflection one can construct a political order. He argues that men can learn from history — the entire list of Federalist Papers is in one sense a large history lesson — and from these lessons, we can discern what works and what does not. The question remains as to whether the Federalist cause makes the best use of the historical record. One theme I will attempt to draw out is what methodology or heuristic of history unites the interpretation of Hamilton, Jay, and Madison in their reading of history and whether that view is correct or not. The fact that the U.S. Constitution is the oldest in continuous use is itself a testimony to the hard work and historical rigor of this founding generation in constructing the document; that they failed to see all eventualities that would undermine the constitutional consensus cannot entirely be held against them. The relevant question is: with what information they had, did they do their due diligence in forming a constitution that could hedge against unseen eventualities?

While the debates over the Constitution were heated, the level of collegiality Hamilton expresses towards his Anti-Federalist opponents is staggering in light of our current political order. This was, of course, at a time when the U.S. was more homogeneous both ethnically and religiously (i.e., Northwest European Protestants). This debate was between two groups of men who shared a vision of liberty but differed on how to achieve it. Unlike today, where conservatives and liberals, Republicans and Democrats, often cannot even agree on the meaning of such words as rights, freedom, and tyranny, we see here a period in U.S. history where most of the terms in use were widely agreed upon.

Today, what is tyranny for one might be freedom for another; anyone who has witnessed the socialist–libertarian debates so far this century, on YouTube and elsewhere, will know what I mean. In the 1780s, however, men such as Hamilton and Henry both agreed on what the terms in use meant; they merely differed on how best to secure the liberties discussed. In our modern context, we are so far removed from this concept that it becomes difficult to imagine how such debates could have taken place. Hamilton wishes to avoid fanatical reprisal and counter-reprisal as seen in religious and political persecution in the Old World. This consensus-based rational foundation for a political order goes back to the Greek polis and the Roman Senate, through the works of the Italian Renaissance humanists and English political theorists of the Reformation. The Founding Fathers rightly saw themselves as the then-modern heirs to that tradition. The many current political and cultural trials besetting the U.S. today can be traced to an abandonment of this tradition.

The concern of the Federalist cause — that a weak U.S. federal government would lead to internal division and strife domestically and invite foreign European intervention internationally — are not idle concerns. A casual look at the history of ancient Greece from 750 to 146 BC shows that from the origin of the polis and self-government in Greece to the absorption of Greece and Macedonia into the Roman state, wider regional unity was never achieved; and external powers — first Persia, then Macedon, and finally Rome — interfered with and violated the freedoms of Greeks with impunity.

After Xerxes’s failed invasion of Greece in 479 BC, future Persian kings kept Greece divided by playing one faction against another. This culminated in Athens’s defeat in the Peloponnesian War and the restoration of the Ionian city-states to Persian rule in the King’s Peace of 387 BC, ending the Corinthian War. This division and infighting invited Philip of Macedon and finally his son Alexander to subjugate the Greeks to Macedonian imperial ambitions. Greek freedom was restored for a time after the death of Alexander, with a constant back-and-forth struggle between the Greek city-states and a revanchist Macedon. The only league that the Greeks developed that seemed to offer geographic unity and political liberty was the Achaean League, culminating under the leadership of Philopoemen and later consolidating the Peloponnese by 146 BC. This achievement was too little too late, and the Achaean League was absorbed into the Roman state.

After the great revolutions in Latin America beginning in 1808–26, the Spanish Empire collapsed in the face of Creole-led revolts, leaving the once-mighty empire only the two colonies of Cuba and Puerto Rico. The history of Mexico offers a good example of how a weak or corrupt federal government will invite foreign invasion. From 1821 to 1917, foreign powers five times tried to interfere directly in Mexican affairs: Spain (1821–29); France (1838); the U.S. (1846–48); France (1862–67); and again the U.S. (1916–17). Such a fate that befell Greece and would later befall Mexico was what Hamilton was seeking to avoid. No idle concern. The countervailing response is: but what if the government itself becomes tyrannical, as became the case in the transition from the Roman Republic to the Roman Empire? The perennial issue for all free societies is the Scylla and Charybdis of a regime too weak to preserve liberty on the one hand, and on the other a regime so powerful that it tramples liberty underfoot.